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INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in China’s courts reflect a paradox largely
avoided in literature on the subject: Can China’s courts play an effective
role in a non-democratic governmental system? Changes to courts’ formal
authority have been limited, courts still struggle to address basic
impediments to serving as fair adjudicators of disputes, and courts
continue to be subject to Communist Party oversight. Courts have also
confronted new challenges, in particular pressure from media reports and
popular protests. At the same time, however, the Party-state has
permitted, and at times encouraged, both significant ground-up
development of the courts and expanded use of the courts as fora for the
consideration of rights-based grievances, including administrative
litigation, class actions, and a small number of discrimination claims filed
directly under the constitution. Some courts have engaged in significant
innovation. Judges are better qualified than in the past, and are
increasingly looking to other courts and judges, rather than Party
superiors, in deciding novel or difficult cases. As a result, courts are
increasingly coming into conflict with other state institutions, growing
numbers of well-educated judges are developing professional identities,
and popular attention to both the problems and the potential roles of the
courts appears higher than ever before.
The current and potential future role of China’s courts has
received wide attention. In China, officials speak of the importance of
court reform for ensuring China’s goals of legal construction and
modernization. But the aims of such reforms have been technical:
improved training of judges, rooting out corruption, increasing efficiency,
and overseeing judges more closely. Such reforms appear aimed at
making the courts institutions for the fair adjudication of individual
disputes. At the same time, commentators in China and in the West have
argued for greater changes, contending that courts should serve not only
as adjudicators of private disputes but also as checks on state power and
as fora for the resolution of public rights – in sum, that the courts should
play a significant role in the development of Chinese governance and
society.
Discussions in both China and the West, however, have largely
avoided two central questions. First, why has the Party-state permitted
the courts to develop even limited new roles? Second, can courts play an
effective role in a non-democratic governmental system? These questions
have assumed renewed importance over the past two years as Party
leaders have reemphasized the obligations of the judiciary to serve Party

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138446

2007]

CHINA’S COURTS: RESTRICTED REFORM

3

goals and as Party-state concern with public opinion and social stability
has led to new pressures on the courts.
This essay surveys recent developments in China’s courts with a
view to beginning to answer these questions. Part I examines recent topdown reforms in China’s courts, highlighting what some advocates of a
stronger judiciary consider signs of progress. Part II discusses new
challenges that may be undermining courts’ already limited autonomy.
Part III argues that the most significant changes in China’s courts are
coming from the ground up, in particular from growing horizontal
interactions among judges. Part IV asks whether recent developments
suggest fundamental changes to courts’ power, and then returns to the two
questions posed above. My focus is primarily on civil and administrative
litigation, where reforms have been more significant than in the criminal
justice system.
Much theoretical scholarship on courts focuses on why
democratic systems permit and encourage the development of
independent courts. Explanations include the knowledge that rulers may
one day find themselves out of office, the desire to make commitments
credible, and the need to constrain bureaucracies. 1 Most such
explanations have limited applicability in China, where courts are not
designed to be independent of Party leadership. Scholarship on the role
of courts in authoritarian societies has been limited. This essay seeks to
add to this literature by exploring why a single-Party state might
encourage court development, and whether courts can play significant
new roles without necessarily challenging Party authority.
II.

REFORMED COURTS?
A.

Caseloads

Western scholars have long warned against equating Chinese
courts with their Western counterparts. As Donald Clarke has noted,
“perhaps Chinese courts are not designed to do, and should not do, the
things Western courts do.” 2 Courts are one of a number of state
bureaucracies with the power to resolve disputes, and lack significant
1

For a helpful summary, see Matthew C. Stephenson, ‘When the Devil Turns . . .’: The
Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 61-64 (2003).
2
Donald Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in BEYOND COMMON
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 171, 164-192 (Erik Jensen &
Thomas Heller eds., Stanford University Press 2003). As Martin Shapiro has noted, few
courts anywhere fit the archetype of “independent judges applying preexisting legal norms
after adversary proceedings to achieve a dichotomous decision.” MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS:
A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (University of Chicago Press 1983).
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oversight powers over other state actors. For much of the period since the
beginning of legal reforms in 1978, courts have remained minor actors in
the overall functioning of the Chinese state. Despite these differences,
Chinese judges and academic commentators have in recent years looked
to Western models of courts and judging in evaluating developments in
China’s courts.3
Are Chinese courts playing fundamentally different roles in
society to those played in the recent past? There is no clear benchmark
for evaluating changes in the position of courts within the Party-state.
Official reports have noted that Chinese courts are handling more cases
than at any time in the past, with some claiming that China is facing a
“litigation explosion.”4 For example, China’s courts reported hearing 8.1
million cases in 2006,5 more than triple the number heard in 1986.6 Yet
such comparisons overstate the growth of litigation in China: as Table 1
shows, caseloads have grown only modestly, if at all, since 1999. The
total number of cases heard in 2006 was only two percent higher than in
2005, and the total number of first instance cases actually decreased by
two percent between 1996 and 2006. Similarly, the total number of first
instance civil cases decreased in four years between 1999 and 2006; the
3

For example, see, Liao Weihua, Fayuan zuzhi fa jiang chutai zhuanjia jianyi jiang renmin
fayuan gaiming fayuan [Court Organization Law Will Come Out, Experts Suggest Changing
People’s Courts into Courts], NANFANG CHUANG [SOUTH CHINA WEB], Dec. 4, 2004,
http://www.southcn.com/news/china/zgkx/200412040062.htm. Although noting that any
reforms must accord with China’s “national conditions”, the Supreme People’s Court has
acknowledged the need to look overseas in designing reforms of China’s courts. Supreme
People’s Court, Renmin fayuan dierge wunian gaige gangyao (2004-2008) [The Second Fiveyear Reform Plan of the People’s Courts (2004-2008)], Oct. 26, 2005, http://www.lawlib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=120832.
4
Yan Maokun, Xiao Yang zai meiguo Yelu Daxue fabiao yanjiang Zhongguo sifa: tiaozhan yu
gaige [Xiao Yang Gives Speech at Yale University on China’s Judiciary: Challenges and
Reforms], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (CHINA COURT WEB), Oct.12, 2004,
http://www.court.gov.cn/forout/200410120005.htm; Beijing susong shuliang baozhashi
zengzhang, qunian 76% anjian weineng jiean [The Number of Cases in Beijing Increases
Explosively, the Percentage of Not Closed Cases Increased by 76% Last Year], FAZHI
WANBAO [BEIJING LEGAL TIMES], Apr. 27, 2005, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-04/27/content_2884636.htm.
5
Courts reported hearing a total of 8,105,007 cases in 2006. Xiao Yang, Zuigao Renmin
Fayuan gongzuo baogao (2007) [Supreme People’s Court Work Report (2007)], Mar. 14,
2007, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=239089. The figure
includes both first instance cases and appeals. Id.
6
The contrast to earlier years is even more striking: official court statistics state that China’s
courts handled just 300,787 first instance civil cases and 14,618 civil appeals in 1978, the year
China began its economic reforms. Hence civil cases have increased more than fourteen-fold
since then. RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Quanguo renmin fayuan sifa
tongji lishi ziliao huibian 1949-1998 (minshi bufen) [Collection of Historical Judicial Data on
the Entire Nation’s People’s Courts 1949-1998 (civil portion)], BEIJING: RENMIN FAYUAN
CHUBAN SHE [PEOPLE’S COURT PRESS] (1999).
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total number of administrative cases likewise decreased in four of those
years.7 The modest increases are striking when set against the backdrop
of China’s rapid economic growth and widespread reports of a surge of
civil disturbances in China.8
The reliability of court statistics is questionable, and thus it would
be a mistake to read too much into apparent increases or decreases in
caseloads. Adjustments to methodologies for collecting statistics,
ideological emphasis in the courts, and incentives to and targets for
individual judges can have a significant effect on the total number of
cases courts report hearing. 9 Nevertheless, lower court judges have
confirmed in interviews that, as the statistics indicate, caseloads have
either declined or grown only modestly over the past five years.10 Judges
attribute such declines to lack of confidence in the courts, in particular to
difficulties successful litigants face in enforcing decisions, and to private
parties’ preference for informal methods of dispute resolution.11
Even if the total number of cases has grown only slightly in recent
years, the long-term trend appears to reflect a modest increase in the use
of the courts, and that a greater range of cases and cases of greater
complexity are being brought. Litigants are also increasingly challenging
7

As Table 1 and Figure 1 show, the total number of first instance civil and administrative
cases peaked in 1999; despite modest increases in recent years, the 2006 figures remained
below the 1999 totals. For analysis of the decline in caseloads, see Xin He, The Recent
Decline in Economic Caseloads in Chinese Courts: Exploration of a Surprising Puzzle, 190
CHINA Q. 352 (2007); Pan Duola, “Susong baozha” wei wenti de beihou [Behind the Fake
Question of a “Litigation Explosion”], YANZHAO DUSHI BAO [YANZHAO METROPOLITAN
DAILY), Apr. 28, 2005, available at
http://he.people.com.cn/GB/channel10/200504/28/7821.html.
8
The conventional wisdom has been that the economic development and reduced state control
over individuals’ lives has resulted in a greater number of cases in the courts. Thus, for
example, Xin Chunying argues that greater use of the courts is a consequence of multiple
factors, including the weakening of administrative oversight of individuals’ lives, the shifting
role of Party-state units, and the lack of protections for rural workers. Xin Chunying, 21 shiji:
Zhongguo xuyao shenmeyang de sifa quanli? [The 21st Century: What Kind of Judicial Power
does China Need?], ZHONGGUO FAZI WANG [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW, CHINA],
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=1712 (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
9
For example, some judges attribute the decline in administrative cases to changes in
reporting methodologies. Whereas in the past a case involving fifty plaintiffs might have been
counted as fifty cases, courts have recently begun to count such cases as a single case.
Likewise, although the official Law Yearbooks show only a three-fold increase in caseloads
since 1987, in a recent speech in 2004 the President of the SPC stated that the total number of
civil cases handled by China’s courts had increased more than ten-fold over the past twenty
years. See Yan, supra note 5.
10
Much of the information in this essay is based on interviews with more than 200 judges,
lawyers, and academics in China. Interviews were conducted in Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangdong, Jiangxi, Hubei, Jilin, Sichuan, and Shaanxi between 2003 and 2007 [hereinafter
Interviews].
11
Id.
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first instance decisions: appeals have grown at a much faster rate than
first instance cases, with appeals nearly doubling between 1995 and 2006.
This increase in appeals suggests that litigants may be both more familiar
with legal procedures, and perhaps more confident of the willingness of
higher courts to issue decisions that differ from those of lower courts.

Table 1: Number of cases (first instance and appeals) closed nationwide,
1994-2006

12

Year

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

1st Crim.

480914

496082

616676

440577

480374

539335

1st Civil12

3427614

3986099

4588958

4720341

4816275

5060611

1st Admin.

34567

51370

79537

88542

98390

98759

All 1st Inst.
Criminal
2nd

3943095

4533551

5285171

5249460

5395039

5698705

52579

53942

67087

64548

70767

78803

Civil 2nd

179687

208263

243510

263664

294219

339929

Admin 2nd

7672

9536

11365

12684

14220

18072

All 2nd
Letters &
Visits to
Courts13
Mediation
by People’s
Mediation
Committees

239938

271741

321962

340896

379206

436804

5847948

6361495

6960162

7131469

9351928

10691048

6123729

6028481

5802230

5543166

5267194

5188646

Prior to 2002 Chinese courts had separate divisions for handling civil cases and economic
cases; they were merged in 2002. The figures for 1994 to 2001 thus include both civil and
economic cases.
13
“Letters and visits” refers to complaints about cases received in writing or in person by
courts; for a discussion of the letters and visits system, see infra pp. 26-29. Complaints about
the courts to letters and visits offices at other Party or state institutions are not included in this
figure.
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2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1 Crim.

560111

623792

628549

634953

644248

683997

701379

1st Civil

4733886

4616472

4393306

4416168

4303744 4360184

4382407

st

st

1
Admin.
All 1st
Inst.
Criminal
2nd

86614

95984

84943

88050

5380611

5336248

5106798

5139171

86619

98157

89440

96797

96204

96776

94092

Civil 2nd

363522

377672

357821

370770

377052

392191

406381

Admin
2nd

19404

22149

27649

25045

27273

29176

29054

All 2nd

469545

497978

474910

492612

500529

518143

529527

Letters &
Visits

9394358

9148816

3656102

3973357

4220222 3995244

Not yet
available

Mediation

5030619

4860695

4636139

4492157

4414233 4486825

Not yet
available

92192

95707

5040184 5139888

95052
5178838

Source for 1994-2005 data: 1995-2006 ZHONGGUO FALÜ NIANJIAN [CHINA LAW
YEARBOOK].
Sources for 2006 data: 2007 SPC WORK REPORT (for first instance data); Supreme
People’s Court, 2006 nian quanguo fayuan shenli zhixing anjian qingkuang [Details
of Cases Tried and Enforced Nationwide in 2006], available at
http://www.dffy.com/sifashijian/ziliao/200703/20070314163527.htm (for data on
second instance cases).
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Figure 1: First Instance Cases, Mediation by People’s Mediation
Committees, and Court Letters and Visits, 1994–2006
Mediation by People's
Mediation Committees

10
8

Total first instance cases

6

First instance criminal cases

4

First instance civil cases

2
2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

0

First instance administrative
cases

1994

Number of Cases, Million

12

Letters and Visits to Courts

Year

Figure 2: Second Instance Cases (appeals), 1994–2006
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The modest growth in litigation in the past few years suggests that
despite emphasis on court reform, courts are not necessarily playing a
greater role relative to other institutions engaged in dispute resolution.
The increase in court caseloads coincided with a decline in the total
number of disputes resolved through People’s Mediation Committees
until 2004.14 As Table 1 and Figure 1 show, the total number of cases
resolved through People’s Mediation Committees decreased each year
from 1994 to 2004.15 Compared to other institutions engaged in dispute
resolution, however, the modest rise in the total number of court cases
appears less significant. Disputes and complaints of all types have
increased in China in recent years, 16 and thus any increase in court
caseloads may simply be part of the more general increase in both
disputes and grievances. For example, far more grievances are raised
through the letters and visits system than through the courts.17 As Table 1
and Figure 1 show, the total number of complaints raised to court letters
and visits offices is only slightly below the number of cases heard.
Commercial arbitration cases, including both domestic and international
disputes, increased by more than twenty percent annually from 2004 to
2006.18 Labor arbitration cases more than quintupled between 1996 and
14

The number of disputes resolved through People’s Mediation Committees grew in 2005, the
first increase in more than a decade. The increase likely reflects renewed state emphasis on
mediation as part of efforts to construct a “harmonious society.” People’s mediation
committees are under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice and are distinct from courtsupervised mediation, which occurs in the context of litigation.
15
For a discussion of the weakening of informal dispute resolution, including mediation, in
Chengdu in recent years, see Di si jie Chengdu fayuan yuanzhang luntan, Qu Ying yuanzhang
kaimu zhici [The Fourth Chengdu Court Presidents’ Forum, Opening Remarks from President
Qu Ying], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Oct. 18, 2004,
http://cdfy.chinacourt.org/yzlt/ [hereinafter The fourth Chengdu court]. People’s Mediation
Committees operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and local justice bureaux,
not the courts. Mediation of cases brought in court also decreased throughout the 1990s, but
appears to have increased recently due to renewed emphasis on mediation by the Supreme
People’s Court. See infra text accompanying note 48.
16
See The fourth Chengdu court, supra note 16.
17
The letters and visits system, or xinfang, refers to offices that exist at most levels of the
Party-state and at most central Party and government departments to handle both written and
in-person complaints. Although the total number of complaints raised is not made public, the
system handles an enormous volume of grievances each year. For a full discussion of the
letters and visits system, see Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to the Formal Chinese
Legal System, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 103-179 (2006).
18
Wen Jie, 2006 Niandu quanguo zhongcai anjian shouli shuju jianxi [Brief Analysis of the
Arbitration Cases Decided Nationally in 2006], ZHONGGUO ZHONGCAI WANG [CHINA
ARBITRATION WEB], Mar. 15, 2007, http://www.chinaarbitration.com/readArticle.do?id=ff80818111440b34011153d7086a0046; Wen Yan, 2005
nian quanguo ge zhongcai weiyuanhui shouli anjian qingkuang [Statistics of Cases Decided
by Arbitration Committees Nationwide in 2005], ZHONGGUO ZHONGCAI WANG [CHINA
ARBITRATION WEB], Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.china-
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2004.19 In addition, Chinese scholars have argued that recourse to social
networks and to government departments and officials remains a
preferred method of dispute resolution, in particular in rural China.20 The
fact that the number of disputes and complaints raised in other institutions
has continued to rise suggests that the decrease in the growth of litigation
has not resulted from increased clarity of legal norms.
B.

Top-Down Reform

Modest growth in caseloads does appear to reflect a conscious
decision by Party-state leaders to strengthen the courts’ ability to resolve
an increasing number of disputes. 21 But the Party-state has also
emphasized reforming other dispute resolution institutions – including the
letters and visits system, mediation, arbitration, and administrative
review. These moves suggest that the Party-state is focused on the need
to resolve disputes and grievances, and thus preserve social stability. But
they do not necessarily reflect a trend toward an increased role for the
courts in comparison to other institutions.
Court reform has, however, received enormous attention over the
past decade. China commenced its project of court reform when it began
reconstruction of its legal system in 1978. The role of the courts received
increased attention in the late 1990s, as China’s leadership renewed
efforts to strengthen the legal system. Following the embrace of “rule of
law” by the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1997, the
Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) in 1999 issued its first five-year plan for
reforming China’s courts. 22 Judicial reform had been a major issue of

arbitration.com/3a1.asp?id=1772&name=%E4%BB%B2%E8%A3%81%E5%8A%A8%E6%
80%81.
19
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL SECURITY, ZHONGUO LAODONG TONGJI NIANJIAN (2005)
[YEARBOOK OF CHINA LABOR STATISTICS (2005)] 523-524, available at
http://www.molss.gov.cn/images/2006-11/16/27110316153762520791.pdf.
20
Guo Xinghua and Wang Ping, Zhongguo nongcun de jiufen yu jiejue tujing: guanyu
zhongguo nongcun falü yishi yu falü xingwei de shizheng yanjiu [Disputes and Resolution
Methods in Rural China: Empirical Research on Legal Consciousness and Legal Action in
Rural China], 2004 JIANGSU SHEHUI KEXUE [JIANGSU SOCIAL SCIENCE] 2, available at
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=3609.
21
For example, see Jiang Zemin, Report to the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party
of China, Sept. 12, 1997, http://dcdj.ccp.org.cn/old/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=3395 (discussing
judicial reform); Xin Chunying, supra note 9 (arguing that courts should be the ultimate
authority for dispute resolution).
22
The SPC serves as the highest court and also manages the court bureaucracy. More than
three hundred judges work at the court, although not all hear cases. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan de
zhize quanxian yu gongzuo yuanze [The SPC’s power and working principle], ZHONGGUO
WANG [CHINA WEB], http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-08/13/content_1024700.htm.
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discussion beginning in the early 1990s,23 but the five-year plan brought
increased attention to the need to strengthen the courts. The plan set forth
fifty goals. 24 In late 2005 the SPC issued a second five-year plan,
covering the period 2004-2008, again listing fifty goals.25
Both plans address problems in the courts, ranging from judicial
training to regularity in court procedures. Thus, for example, the 2005
plan calls for reforms to trial procedures and rules of evidence; clarifying
procedural requirements for rehearings; addressing problems with
enforcement; reforming the composition of adjudication committees;
strengthening mediation and the use of simplified trial procedures;
improving courts’ management of cases; improving training and
discipline; and reforming the system by which judges’ performance is
assessed. Such reforms are largely either general and overly abstract, or
are primarily technical changes designed to address competence and
fairness, not courts’ authority or influence over other state actors.
The goals of the 2005 plan, although similar in number, also
appear modest when compared to the 1999 plan. 26 The 1999 plan
included not only specific goals but also details regarding the schedule for
accomplishing such goals and the mechanisms for doing so; in contrast,
the 2005 reform speaks only in declaratory terms. The earlier plan also
embraced some quite significant reforms, including the creation of rules
of evidence and the separation within courts of the acceptance of cases
from adjudication and adjudication of cases from enforcement. With one
exception – the reform of procedures for capital cases – the 2005 reforms
include no major breakthroughs. Instead, the plan largely reflects
changes already underway in the courts.
The 2005 plan does mention the need to address centralizing court
appointments – a step toward breaking the link between local authorities,
which generally control court appointments, and judges. But the plan
proposes doing so only within “given areas,” not nationally. And it raises
the topic of centralized financing of courts, but proposes no specific steps
toward this goal. The plan also states that courts should receive
23
Zhang Zhiming, Sifa gaige xuyao geng kuankuo de shiye: dui Zuigao Fayuan wunian gaige
gangyao de yidian pinglun [Judicial Reform Needs a Broader View: Some Comments on the
SPC’s Five Year Reform Program], ZHONGGUO FAZI WANG [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW,
CHINA], http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=256 (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
24
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, RENMIN FAYUAN WUNIAN GAIGE GANGYAO [THE FIVE-YEAR
PROGRAM FOR REFORM OF THE PEOPLE’S COURTS], Oct. 20, 1999, available at
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=23701.
25
RENMIN FAYUAN DIERGE WUNIAN GAIGE GANGYAO (2004-2008) [THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR REFORM
PLAN OF THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2004-2008)], supra note 4.
26
Although the plan covers the period 2004-2009, it was not made public until 2005. The
delay may reflect internal division regarding the contents of the plan.
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supervision from People’s Congresses and reiterates that procurators may
participate in court adjudication committees.27 Given the constitutional
status of the procuracy and the people’s congresses,28 such statements may
simply be an acknowledgment that reform must take place within existing
constitutional constraints, but they also may reflect the SPC’s attempt to
make clear that reform is not designed significantly to expand court
power or autonomy, and that external oversight of and intervention in
court work continues to be legitimate.
Despite the limited goals of the official plans, courts have
undertaken significant reforms designed to strengthen both the
competence of judges and the professionalism of the court system. Most
significantly, the education levels of judges have improved dramatically.
Media reports in mid-2005 stated that, for the first time, more than fifty
percent of Chinese judges had university degrees.29 This marks a sharp
increase from 6.9 percent in 1995. Since 2002, all new judges in China
have been required to possess bachelors degrees.30 Likewise, in 2002 the
Supreme People’s Court stated that sitting judges who were below age
forty would be required to obtain a degree within five years or would lose
their jobs. Older judges who lacked a university education would be
27
Adjudication committees, which exist in all courts, discuss and resolve difficult or sensitive
cases, sometimes upon their own instigation and sometimes when cases are referred to the
committee by the panel hearing the case. Adjudication committee members – who generally
do not hear the cases they decide --include court presidents and vice-presidents and other
senior judges within a court. The provision in the Five Year Plan is notable because although
courts have in the past had the discretion to include procuratorates in adjudication committee
discussions (without voting power), it appears that in practice courts rarely do so.
28
The PRC Constitution makes explicit that both the SPC and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate are “responsible to the National People’s Congress.” XIAN FA arts. 128, 133
(P.R.C.). The Constitution also states that the courts, procurators and public security bureaux
shall coordinate their efforts in handling criminal cases, thus perhaps providing support for the
inclusion of procurators in court adjudication committees. Both the courts and the
procuratorates are to exercise their power independently, defined as “not subject to
interference by administrative organs, public organizations, or individuals.” Id. arts. 126, 131,
135. Such phrasing is generally understood to permit supervision of the courts and
procuratorates by people’s congresses, the Party, and each other.
29
Woguo faguan he jianchaguan zhengti suzhi tigao benke bili guoban [The Overall Quality
of Our Nation’s Judges and Procurators is Raised, More than Half are University Graduates],
RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], July 17, 2005, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-07/17/content_3228617.htm. The source of and
methodology used to calculate the figure is unclear. It is likely that the fifty percent number
includes not only graduates of four-year universities, but also graduates of evening classes,
junior colleges, or da zhuan (大专), as well as judges who have received university degrees
through correspondence courses. These degrees are not necessarily in law. Gao Yifei,
Xiaoxue biye dang faguan: wenti daodi zai nali [Becoming a Judge with Only an Elementary
School Education: What’s the Problem?], JINGJI YU FA WANG [ECONOMICS AND LAW WEB],
May 7, 2005, http://www.jjyf.com/webpage/news/050218/fg.htm.
30
Judges Law, art. 9.
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permitted to stay on only if they completed a six-month or one-year
training course.31 The courts have placed extensive emphasis on training
judges, with tens of thousands of judges undergoing specialized legal
training each year.32 Many new judges, in particular at higher-level courts
in major cities, now possess graduate degrees in law. New judges in
China are also now required to pass the national unified judicial exam,
which has had a pass rate of roughly ten percent in the past five years.
Those who became judges before 2002, however, are not required to pass
the bar exam.33 Court presidents − who generally are the most powerful
figures within courts and who take part in deciding major or sensitive
cases − likewise are not required to be judges or to pass the bar exam.34
The SPC has also taken steps to improve the quality of court
decisions. In 2005 the SPC issued a notice stating that opinions should
include both accurate descriptions of the facts and evidence and logical
arguments and legal reasoning.35 In so doing, the SPC appeared to agree
31

Wenping shangqu budengyu shuiping tigao, faguan peixun buneng zhi benzhe wenping qu
[An Advanced Degree Does Not Equal Enhanced Ability, Judge’s Training Should Not Solely
Aim at Degrees], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA WEB], Mar. 11, 2004,
http://news3.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-03/11/content_1360136.htm. Obtaining such
training, however, appears relatively easy.
32
Id.; Hua Xuan, Zhiye faguan bailian chenggang [Professional Judges Being Tempered Into
Steel], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Oct. 16, 2002,
http://www.snweb.com/gb/people_daily/2002/10/16/j1016003.htm.
33
An SPC notice implementing the Judges Law also states that persons who are not judges
may not be appointed to positions on court adjudication committees or as heads of divisions
within courts without first passing the bar exam.
34
Su Zelin, Zou you Zhongguo tese de jingying faguan zhi lu [Taking the Route to Elite Judges
with Special Chinese Characteristics], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], June
26, 2002, http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=5672; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
guanyu guanche luoshi “Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo faguan fa” de tongzhi [Notice of the
Supreme People’s Court Regarding Implementation of the ‘Judges Law’ of the People’s
Republic of China], July 11, 2001,
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=38471.
35
Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu zai quanguo fayuan minshi he
xingzheng shenpan bumen kaizhan ‘Guifan sifa xingwei, cujin sifa gongzheng’ zhuanxiang
zhenggai huodong de tongzhi [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court regarding implementing
the ‘Standardizing judicial acts, enhancing judicial justice’ special alteration and correction
movement in the civil and administrative divisions of courts nationwide], July 15, 2005,
http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/gj/21/6677.html. SPC President Xiao Yang likewise has stated
that courts should give more attention to including legal reasoning in court opinions. Xiao
Yang zai Henan sheng kaocha fayuan gongzuo shi yaoqiu fayuan yaowei goujian hexie shehui
tigong youli sifa baozhang [While inspecting courts’ work in Henan, Xiao Yang requests that
courts provide effective judicial safeguards for the construction of a harmonious society],
ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Feb. 24, 2006,
http://www.court.gov.cn/news/bulletin/release/200602240017.htm. Similarly, both the SPC
and local courts have issued statements on the importance of improving the quality of court
opinions. Quanguo fayuan jiang shixing anjian zhiliang guanli zhidu jianshao shenli chacuo
[Courts Nationwide will Implement a Quality Control System to Reduce Mistaken Decisions],
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with arguments from scholars that improving the quality of court opinions
would boost public confidence in the courts and facilitate court efforts to
resist interference.36 The Supreme People’s Court has also taken repeated
steps to crack down on corruption.37
The higher education levels of judges and the attention to wellreasoned opinions appear to be yielding results. Judges comment that
greater competence in the judiciary increases the ability of courts to resist
external pressure by relying on legal arguments or well-reasoned
opinions. 38 In addition, judges say that whereas in the past such
intervention might have come either formally, in the form of written
instructions (pi tiaozi) or through telephone calls, courts increasingly are
swayed only by written instructions. Many such instructions tell courts to
“emphasize” a case, or handle a particular case “according to law,” rather
than dictating outcomes, although even instructions in such form may
make clear the desired outcome. It is difficult to assess whether
interference in China’s courts is increasing or decreasing. Some in China
argue that external interference in the courts is actually growing,
reflecting both falling confidence in the courts and the rise of the
importance of popular opinion and social protest as means of influencing
the courts. Others note that courts are playing more important roles than
in the past – hence the greater need for intervention. But it does appear
that courts confronted by such pressures are increasingly likely to try to
use legal arguments to resist.
Most public discussion of interference on court decision-making
focuses on the need to reduce corruption and opportunities for corruption,
not intervention by Party officials.39 But limited evidence does suggest

YANGSHI GUOJI [CCTV INTERNATIONAL], June 30, 2004, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-06/30/content_1557006.htm; Chengdu fayuan: tong an
butong pan? kan kan ‘yangban an’ [Chengdu Courts: Same Cases, Different Decisions? Look
at ‘Model Cases’], SICHUAN XINWEN WANG [SICHUAN NEWS NET], Apr. 23, 2005, available at
http://cn.news.yahoo.com/050423/159/2b82x.html.
36
For example, see Fu Yulin, Minshi caipan wenshu de gongneng yu fengge [Function and
Style of Civil Cases Decisions], 2000 ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE [CHINA SOCIAL SCIENCES] 4,
available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=22445.
37
For an example, see Zuigaofa jiuxiang cuoshi jiaqiang zhidu fanfu, jian ‘si bu wei’ jizhi
[Nine Measures of the SPC for Enhancing the Anti-Corruption System, Establishing the ‘Four
Forbidden Acts’ Regime], ZHONGGUO PUFA WANG [CHINA LEGAL EDUCATION WEB], Mar. 30,
2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2005-03/30/content_2762253.htm.
38
Interviews.
39
Recent steps in Beijing to fight judicial corruption prohibit six forms of private contact
between judges and lawyers, including private meetings, attending non-official activities
together, or receiving payments. The regulations generated controversy, with some academics
arguing that such conduct was already prohibited, that the regulations were too general, and
that the regulations would fail to have any significant effect. Zhai Jingmin, Zhuo Zeyuan, He
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that increased awareness of law and better training of judges may, over
time, make it easier for judges to respond to some forms of external
pressure. Likewise, judges in some intermediate and higher courts state
that they now refuse to answer inquiries (qingshi) from lower-court
judges about how pending cases in lower courts should be handled unless
such requests are in writing. Some intermediate and higher courts now
require such requests to come from court adjudication committees.
Intervention continues, however, and continues to be a legitimate
action by Party officials. Decreased direct intervention in cases may
reflect greater respect for the courts.40 But greater political sophistication
in the courts may also make direct intervention by officials outside the
courts less necessary, because courts are well aware of the cases most
likely to be of concern to Party leaders. Judges recognize the need to
balance legal requirements with powerful interests. Officials seeking to
pressure the courts may also have mechanisms for doing so other than
direct intervention. Improvements have been greater in routine cases
than in politically sensitive ones. For example, judges comment that they
are rarely under pressure in intellectual property cases because these cases
do not touch on core Party interests. But the scope of sensitive cases
remains wide and can include not only major criminal or political cases,
but also cases involving the financial interests of either the Party-state or
individuals with Party-state ties, cases involving high profile companies,
those involving a large number of potential plaintiffs, and cases receiving
extensive media coverage.
Not all reforms have been as successful as the efforts to boost
education and training.
Notably, court leaders have repeatedly
emphasized the need to address the problems courts face in enforcing
their decisions. Nevertheless, lack of enforcement continues to be a
major problem,41 with one report stating that as many as thirty percent of
Weifang and You Zhenhui, Toushi Beijing shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan ‘liutiao jinling’
[Perspectives on the Beijing High People's Court’s ‘six bans’],
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Aug. 26, 2004, available at
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/xwzx/2004-08/26/content_128630.htm.
40
Judges acknowledge that they may not always be aware of intervention in cases: officials or
other interested parties seeking to influence courts often contact court presidents or vicepresidents, who then may exert influence over outcomes without indicating that there has been
external pressure.
41
Zuigao Fayuan huiying sida jiaodian huati: sixing fuhe, zhixing nan… [SPC Replies to Four
Hot Topics: Death Penalty Review, Difficulty of Enforcement…], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA
NET], Mar. 11, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/200603/11/content_4289573.htm; Zhongwai sifajie shouci xieshou yantao zhixing chengxu gaige
[The First Cooperation Between Chinese and Foreign Judiciaries on the Study of Reforms to
the Enforcement Process], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET], July 12, 2005, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-07/12/content_3208267.htm.
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all civil cases are not enforced.42 The number of enforcement decisions
issued by courts almost doubled between 1994 and 2004. The increase
likely reflects greater court emphasis on enforcing decisions – but it may
also be a sign of the continued tendency of many litigants to ignore court
judgments against them.
Local court judges acknowledge that
enforcement of judgments continues to be a major challenge.43
Difficulties enforcing decisions reflect problems that courts
cannot address on their own: local protectionism, continued intervention
in cases by Party-state officials and administrative departments, an
undeveloped credit system, and weak punishment for non-compliance
with court orders. In an acknowledgement of the continuing difficulties
in enforcement, the Party’s Central Political-Legal Committee issued a
notice in December 2005 calling for the cooperation of the police and the
procuracy in the enforcement of court judgments and for the
establishment of a comprehensive enforcement information system that
involves government departments overseeing banks, real estate, vehicles
and other sectors.44 Similarly, repeated official statements regarding the
importance of combating corruption in the judiciary suggest that
corruption continues to be a major problem, one that reflects the difficulty
of strengthening the authority of courts so long as they remain subject to
extensive external influence.
One response of courts to problems in enforcement has been
renewed stress on mediation by the courts. 45 In 2004, the SPC issued a
notice emphasizing the importance of mediation.46 The most recent SPC
42
He Cong, Facilitating Property Execution, CHINA DAILY WEB, Nov. 30, 2004,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/30/content_395807.htm. One 2006 report
stated that sixty percent of the enforcement cases in the Beijing Second Intermediate Court
could not be enforced at all; another twenty percent could be enforced only in part. Zhao Lei,
Zuigaoyuan yanzhong de ‘zhiben zhi ce’ fuchu [The SPC’s ‘Strategy for Addressing the
Roots’ Floats Out”], NANFANG ZHOUMOU [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], July 6, 2006, available at
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20060706/xw/szxw1/200607060008.asp.
43
Interviews.
44
Zhongyang Zhengfawei: Dongyuan shehui liliang, qieshi jiejue zhixing nan [Central
Political-Legal Committee: Mobilize the Resources of Society, Conscientiously Solve the
Problem of Enforcing Judgments], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET], Jan. 23, 2006, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2006-01/23/content_4090238.htm.
45
Similarly, the Ministry of Justice, which oversees People’s Mediation Committees, has
reemphasized the importance of mediation in serving the interests of building a “harmonious
society.” Sifabu biaozhang mintiao gongzuo ‘shuangxian’ [Ministry of Justice Commends the
‘Two Advances’ in People’s Mediation Work], Mar. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/moj/jcgzzds/2005-05/17/content_133971.htm.
46
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan minshi tiaojie gongzuo ruogan wenti de
jueding [Decision of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding Some Questions Relating to Civil
Mediation by People’s Courts], Sept. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/ssf/200409/20040916181153.htm.
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work report stated that courts are continuing to emphasize mediation as a
means of reducing contradictions and conflict in society. The report
stated that thirty percent of all civil cases were resolved through
mediation in 2006, and that fifty-five percent of first-instance civil cases
were mediated or withdrawn prior to judgment. 47 Many judges, in
particular those in basic level courts, comment that the percentage of
cases resolved through court mediation is now increasing, after declining
throughout the 1990s. Judges cite two primary reasons for renewed
attention to mediation: mediated decisions are more likely to be enforced
than are adjudicated cases, and mediated cases are less likely to result in
protests and complaints.
Some reforms may actually encourage intervention in decisions
by higher-ranking judges or officials. For example, an SPC decision
issued in 2001 stated that court presidents and vice-presidents will be
forced to resign if their courts issue illegal decisions that harm state or
public interests, fail to investigate or reveal serious cases of wrongdoing
sufficiently, or fail to engage in oversight over their courts.48 The rules
reflect the fact that judicial independence in China refers to the
independence of courts, not individual judges. Although courts are
expected to be free from interference from other administrative actors,
individual judges are not expected to decide cases in isolation. Court
presidents are responsible for decisions in their courts, even though they
generally do not hear such cases. Likewise, discussions about a pending
case with judges who did not participate in hearing the case, or with
superiors within courts, are legitimate. Nevertheless, scholars have
criticized the regulations for encouraging court presidents – who often
have close ties to local officials – to intervene in pending cases in their
courts.49
Such reforms also highlight the continuing importance of court
presidents, whose appointments generally continue to be controlled by the
local Party-state. Many, and perhaps most, court presidents lack formal
47

2007 SPC WORK REPORT.
Difang geji renmin fayuan ji zhuanmen renmin fayuan yuanzhang, fu yuanzhang yinjiu
cizhi guiding (shixing) [Rule Regarding Accepting Blame and Resigning for Presidents and
Vice Presidents of All Levels of Local Courts and Special Courts (interim)], Nov. 6, 2001,
available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-11/07/content_26864.htm.
49
Su Li, Zhongguo sifa gaige luoji de yanjiu: ping Zuigao Fayuan de ‘yinjiu cizhi guiding’ [A
Study on the Logic of Chinese Judicial Reform: Comments on the SPC’s Rule Regarding
Taking the Blame and Resigning], FALU SIXIANG WANG [LAW THINKER NET], Dec. 31, 2005,
available at http://law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=3023. Scholars also argued that the rules
violated the constitution – which vests control of appointment and removal of court presidents
in people’s congresses, not in superior courts. He Weifang, Sifa gaige de kongjian tuozhan
[The Expanding Space of Judicial Reform], BEIDA FALU XINXI WANG [CHINA LAW INFO], Mar.
2, 2006, available at http://www.chineselawyer.com.cn/pages/2006-3-2/s33846.html.
48
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legal training or experience in the courts. The failure to reform the system
of appointments of court presidents continues to serve as a major
impediment to strengthening the courts.
Similarly, the court
responsibility system, pursuant to which judges may be fined or removed
from office for decisions that are altered or reversed on appeal,
encourages judges to seek guidance on handling individual cases from
their superiors – both within their court and in higher courts.50
C.

Depoliticization?

Courts continue to be subject to Party leadership. Nevertheless,
prior to 2006 there appeared to be some steps toward reducing the
political role of courts. Scholars in China have argued that the courts
have gradually shifted from primarily serving as political tools in criminal
campaigns in the early 1980s to focusing on providing justice in
individual cases today.51 These trends do not apply in politically sensitive
cases, where courts often have little say in the final outcomes. But
China’s courts have at times appeared to signal that they are no longer
solely political tools of the state. Court rhetoric has changed over the past
decade, reflecting a modest attempt by the courts to shift from being a
tool for enforcing Party policy to being a neutral forum for dispute
resolution. Thus, for example, the SPC’s 1996 Work Report emphasized
the court’s role in carrying out the Party’s “strike hard” campaign against
crime and noted a number of important cases in which defendants were
sentenced to death. In contrast, the 2006 report, although stating that the
courts continue to work to “uphold Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three
Represents under the leadership of Communist Party Secretary General
Hu Jintao,” also noted the importance of courts being impartial and
protecting the human rights of criminal defendants.52 Many judges have
replaced their military-style uniforms with robes – a change viewed as a
50

The system may also discourage higher courts from fully addressing incorrect decisions on
appeal, as they may be reluctant to take action that could result in punishment to lower court
judges.
51
Yu Zhong, Lun Zuigao Renmin Fayuan shiji chengdan de zhengzhi gongneng: yi Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan linian ‘gongzuo baogao’ wei yiju [On the Actual Political Function of the
Supreme People’s Court: Using the Annual “Work Report” of the Supreme People’s Court as
a Base], 7 QINGHUA FAXUE [TSINGHUA LEGAL STUDIES], available at http://lawthinker.com/show.asp?id=2829 (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
52
2006 SPC WORK REPORT. Other recent reports have used similar language. For a
discussion of changes in the reports, see Chen Ruihong, Sifa yu minzhu: Zhongguo sifa
minzhuhua jiqi pipan [Judiciary and Democracy: The Democratization of the Chinese
Judiciary and its Critique] BEIDA FALU XINXI WANG [CHINA LAW INFO], available at
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=2638 (last visited
July 1, 2006).
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step forward by some academics who praise such changes as a way of
signaling that judges and courts are not simply another branch of the
Party-state. 53 Likewise, the new education requirements for judges
represent a shift away from primary reliance on political backgrounds in
selecting members of the judiciary.54
It would be a mistake to read too much into these trends.
Emphasis on the rights of defendants may represent a shift in Party
policy, rather than a reduced political function for the courts.
Depoliticisation in the courts also results from the broadening range of
disputes in the courts; compared to the past, courts today confront a much
greater number of cases that do not touch on sensitive issues. Courts do
not appear more likely to challenge Party authority than in the past.
Indeed, depoliticisation – to the degree it has occurred – may be possible
precisely because courts are not a challenge to Party authority. Local
Party organizations continue to oversee court appointments, court
presidents are often primarily chosen for political reasons, and the
overwhelming majority of judges continue to be Party members.55 Within
the Party hierarchy, the President of the Supreme People’s Court ranks
well below the Minister of Public Security, a pattern generally replicated
at the local level.56 Party leaders may desire that courts be fairer and more
efficient, but there is little sign of intent to transform the courts’ position
in the Chinese political structure.
53

Ganshou sifa zunyan: chuan fapao qiao fachui xingshi beihou de yiyi hezai [Feeling the
Honor of the Judiciary: What’s the Meaning Behind the Actions of Wearing Robes and Hitting
Gavels], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET], June 5, 2002, available at
http://news3.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-06/05/content_425067.htm; Renmin fayuan
faguanpao chuanzhuo guiding [People’s Courts Rules on Wearing Judges’ Robes], Jan. 24,
2002, available at http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/ssf/200311/20031109141209.htm; Renmin
fayuan fachui shiyong guiding [People’s Courts Rules on Using Gavels], Dec. 24, 2001,
available at http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/ssf/200311/20031109141310.htm. Although the
SPC originally called for all judges to adopt robes, basic level judges in many areas have not
done so.
54
Xin, supra note 9. For an argument that China’s courts are transforming “from a military
instrument of proletarian dictatorship to a professional legal institution,” see Sida Liu, Beyond
Global Convergence: Conflicts of Legitimacy in a Lower Chinese Court, 31 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 75, 75-106 (2006).
55
One recent report stated that eighty percent of judges are Party members. Wang Mingyi,
Faguan duiwu dangyuan xianjinxing jianshe yao tuchu liangzhi jiaoyu [The Advanced
Construction of the Corps of Party-Member Judges Must Project Moral Education],
ZHONGGUO FAGUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], July 17, 2006,
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200607/17/211694.shtml.
56
Similarly, the less ambitious nature of the second five-year plan may suggest that the courts,
or court leaders, are less influential in the Party structure than they were even a few years ago.
Within the government hierarchy, however, the reverse is the case: the SPC President has the
rank of a Deputy Premier, while the Minister of Public Security has the lower rank of full
minister.
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Courts’ loyalty to the Party was re-emphasized in 2006 with the
launching of a new campaign on “socialist rule of law theory” in the
courts, procuratorates, justice bureaux, and public security bureaux.
Under the slogan of “Education on Socialist Rule of Law Theory,” judges
nationwide are being instructed in the importance of following Party
leadership. The campaign began with a speech by Luo Gan (罗干), head
of the Party’s Central Political-Legal Committee, in which he stated that
the goals of the campaign were to guarantee the legal and political
system’s “political color” and loyalty to the Party, the nation, the people,
and the law. The five elements of the campaign include “ruling the
country by law,” “implementing law for the people,” “maintaining
fairness and justice,” “serving the overall situation,” and “following the
leadership of the Party.”57 In the speech Luo appeared to be drawing a
distinction between “rule of law” and “socialist rule of law,” with the
latter emphasizing the legal system’s obligation to follow Party
leadership, and in particular Hu Jintao’s theory of a “harmonious
society.” The speech may also signal a renewed attempt to use law to
reassert central control over local governments. The SPC has instructed
all courts nationwide to educate judges in these principles.58 In a followup speech, Cao Jianming, vice-president of the Supreme People’s Court,
linked the campaign to the need to avoid the “negative influence of
Western rule of law theory”59 – an apparent reference to those within and
57

Luo Gan zai shehui zhuyi fazhi linian yantaoban shang qiangdiao: shenru kanzhan shehui
zhuyi fazhi linian jiaoyu, qieshi jiaqiang zhengfa duiwu sixiang zhengzhi jianshe [Luo Gan
emphasizes in a symposium on socialist rule of law theory: deepen education on socialist rule
of law theory, enhance the ideological and political construction among workers in the
political-legal system], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], 14 Apr., 2006,
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=201753. In a later speech, in November 2006,
Luo again called for strengthening Party oversight of legal institutions. He also added a more
direct critique of those advocating judicial independence and western-style legal reforms. Luo
warned against underestimating the influence of such arguments, in particular arguments that
deny the Party’s leadership of legal and political institutions, on those working in the politicallegal system. He also stated that “hostile forces” were trying to use legal institutions as an
entry-point for westernizing and splitting China. Luo Gan, Zhengfa jiguan zai goujian hexie
shehui zhong danfu zhongda lishi shiming he zhengzhi zeren [Political and legal institutions
shoulder an important historical mission and political responsibility in the construction of a
harmonious society], 2007 QIUSHI [SEEKING TRUTH] No. 3 (Feb. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20070201/GB/qs%5E448%5E0%5E1.htm.
58
Xiao Yang zai Zuigao Renmin Fayuan dangzu xuexihui shang qiangdiao: shenru kaizhan
shehui zhuyi fazhi linian jiaoyu, quebao fayuan duiwu shehui zhuyi zhengzhi bense [Xiao Yang
emphasizes in the study meeting of the Supreme People’s Court party group: deepen
education on socialist rule of law theory, ensure the socialist political colour of the court
system],ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Apr. 27, 2006,
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=203189.
59
Cao Jiaming zai shehui zhuyi fazhi linian yantaoban shang qiangdiao: renmin fayuan yao
laogu shuli shehui zhuyi fazhi linian [Cao Jianming emphasizes in the symposium on socialist
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outside of China advocating Western-style judicial independence for
China. The speech appeared to be a rare public instance of court officials
explicitly warning of the need to avoid excessive Western influence in the
courts.60
III.

NEW PRESSURES:
INEQUALITY

POPULISM, TRANSPARENCY, AND

The recent focus on reinforcing political orthodoxy in the courts
reflects the modest reach of top-down court reform. The evolution of
Chinese society and governance has also resulted in new challenges for
the courts. Some of these pressures, notably greater public attention to
and scrutiny of court actions, may over time result in courts that act more
fairly and with greater competence. But new pressures on the courts also
demonstrate that recent reforms have not fundamentally altered courts’
roles or their relationships to other institutions. This section discusses
five trends that reflect new pressures on the courts and that threaten to
undermine their already fragile authority.
A.

Media Pressure

Over the past decade China’s courts have confronted increasingly
aggressive and influential media. China’s media have long been far
more powerful actors in the Chinese political system than the courts,
serving both as the mouthpiece and as the “eyes and ears” of the Party.
The growth of commercial media in the 1990s allowed the media to
combine their traditional official role with marketized mass appeal. This
included expanded coverage of the legal system. Likewise, the growth of
rule of law theory: the people’s courts must steadily establish socialist rule of law theory],
ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Apr. 14, 2006,
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=201755. Cao also spoke of the need to avoid
“extreme ‘left’ thoughts” and the “remnants of feudalism.” Cao’s speech appeared primarily
aimed at placing the courts in line with current Party ideology. Doing so may be designed to
insulate the courts from criticism for excessive reliance on Western models. But such
comments also reflect the SPC’s move away from aggressively promoting court reform.
60
Cao’s language was, however, very similar to language used by Luo Gan in an article in the
Party’s flagship magazine, Qiushi, suggesting that Cao was simply using the language adopted
by the Party’s Central Political-Legal Committee. Luo Gan, Shenru kazhan shehui zhuyi fazhi
linian jiaoyu, qieshi jiaqiang zhengfa duiwu sixiang zhengzhi jianshe [Deeply develop
education on socialist rule of law theory, earnestly strengthen the construction of political
thought among political and legal personnel], 2006 QIUSHI [SEEKING TRUTH] No. 12. Both
Cao’s speech and Luo’s article appeared primarily aimed at placing the courts in line with
current Party ideology. For Cao, doing so may also reflect a defensive move designed to
insulate the courts from criticism for excessive reliance on Western models.
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investigative journalism and “popular opinion supervision” by the still
Party-controlled media included a significant volume of critical reporting
on the courts. The internet has facilitated such coverage, with news on
major cases spreading rapidly online and courts finding it more difficult
to block critical reporting.61
The media are playing an important role in exposing injustice and
in pressuring courts to behave fairly. Media coverage can force courts to
address long-ignored cases and to follow procedural and substantive legal
standards. Legal aid and public interest lawyers, for example, comment
that having the media on one’s side is often the most important factor
leading to a successful lawsuit. Judges comment that it is far more
difficult to conceal incorrect or unfair decisions than in the past.
At the same time, media coverage also reinforces Party oversight
of the courts. Media coverage of cases and media efforts to stir-up and
claim to represent popular opinion can lead officials to intervene in cases.
Officials do so either formally, through written instructions, or
informally, through telephone calls and discussions with court leaders.
This is particularly true in criminal cases, where media coverage and
claims to represent populist demands for justice can lead courts to treat
criminal defendants harshly. Judges complain that there is little they can
do to resist media pressure, even when media views are inconsistent with
substantive or procedural law.
The ability of the media to influence the courts reflects the fact
that the media have long been more influential actors than the courts.
When media and court views diverge, Party leaders appear to continue to
trust the media more than they do the courts. In a system in which
intervention in individual cases by Party officials remains legitimate –
Party officials are supposed to intervene in cases where the courts appear
to be going astray, a point made by positive media coverage of
intervention in the official Party press – even the threat of intervention
can be sufficient to affect cases. Deference to media views is accentuated
by concern for social stability: the fact that a case is attracting significant
media and popular attention is often sufficient reason to justify
intervention, regardless of the underlying dispute. Media pressure may be
particularly influential in part because media content remains subject to
extensive Propaganda Department oversight. New technologies are
making such control more difficult for the Party, but in major or sensitive
cases the media often continue to speak with one voice. The media’s
ability to influence the courts, and to do so by stirring-up popular
61

For analysis of court-media relations, see Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?
The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-157 (2005).
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sentiment online, reflects the degree to which assuaging popular demands
for justice remains more important than deciding cases according to legal
and procedural norms.
B.

Petitions and Protests

Courts have also increasingly come under pressure from
petitioners and protestors. As Table 1 shows, courts reported handling
just under four million “letters and visits” in 2005. The figure includes
only letters and visits to the courts – and thus excludes complaints about
the courts raised with other Party-state actors or institutions.62 The 2004
figure is less than half of the ten million letters and visits handled five
years earlier, in 1999. Court officials have suggested that the decline in
the number of letters and visits reflects improvements in the courts. In
fact, the decline likely reflects court concerns with reducing the volume
of complaints. In his 2007 Work Report, for example, SPC President
Xiao Yang noted that letters and visits to lower courts had declined by
eleven percent in 2006.63 In some local courts the annual evaluation of
judges’ performance and bonuses now are based in part on the volume of
letters and visits resulting from individual judges’ cases. 64 In other
jurisdictions, courts have made it harder for petitions and complaints
about the courts to be filed, stating that petitions may only be filed with
higher-level courts.65
62

Complaints raised with the courts generally concern court actions, and in particular cases
that courts have adjudicated. Complaints regarding the courts may also be raised with letters
and visits offices of other Party-state institutions.
63
2007 SPC WORK REPORT. Xiao also stated that letters and visits to the SPC decreased by
nearly five percent. The report did not provide total figures for letters and visits to the courts
in 2006.
64
Beijing fayuan dui zhongda shesu xinfang an jiang shixing lingdao baoan zhidu [Beijing
courts will implement a system making court leaders responsible for the resolution of major
litigation-related letters and visits], ZHONGGUO XINWEN WANG [CHINA NEWS NET], July 28,
2005, http://news.qq.com/a/20050728/000926.htm; Shandong fayuan chuangxin jizhi jiejue
shesu xinfang tuchu wenti [Shangdong courts’ innovative system for resolving outstanding
problems in litigation-related letters and visits], XINHUA WANG SHANDONG PINDAO [XINHUA
NET SHANDONG CHANNEL], July 28, 2005,
http://news.sdinfo.net/72339069014638592/20050728/1384196.shtml; Yiqie weile laobaixing:
Jiangsu sheng Suqian Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan xinfang gongzuo jishi [All for the ordinary
people: Jiangsu province Suqian Municipality Intermediate People’s Court’s work on letters
and visits], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Mar. 10, 2006,
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=197942.
65
Jianshao xinfang fasheng, Hebei fayuan shensu anjian shangti yiji guanxia [To minimize
letters and visits, Hebei courts shift the jurisdiction for handling rehearing petitions to higherlevel courts], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET], Jan. 10, 2006,
http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/200601/10/t20060110_5781631.shtml. In some courts
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Despite these statistics and the fact that most petitions and visits
fail to have any effect on the courts or Party leaders, judges say that
pressure from letters and visits has increased in recent years and that
courts are often under pressure from court and Party superiors to resolve
petitioners’ grievances. This is the case even when, according to judges,
such complaints lack legal merit. Court officials have repeatedly noted
that dealing with petitions and visits is distracting them from their work
handling cases and that courts handle nearly as many petitions as they do
actual cases.66
Much of the press coverage of the issue in China highlights how
letters and visits have led courts to alter incorrect decisions or have
assisted in compelling parties to implement court judgments. 67 Judges
confirm that some petitions and protests do result in courts reexamining
and correcting erroneous cases. 68 Other accounts, however, note that
courts have paid petitioners themselves when court decisions fail to
provide sufficient funds to petitioners.69 Reports have also noted judges’
emphasis on solving cases likely to have a major “social impact” so as to
prevent possible public disruption. 70 Commentators have argued that

figures on letters and visits include only complaints regarding closed cases, not those still
pending.
66
2003 SPC WORK REPORT; 2004 SPC WORK REPORT. For an argument that petitions distract
courts from working on cases, see Zuo Weimin & He Yongjun, Zhengfa chuantong yu sifa
lixing: yi Zuigao Fayuan xinfang zhidu wei zhongxin de yanjiu [Politics and law, tradition and
judicial rationality: research centred on the SPC’s letters and visits system], 2005 SICHUAN
DAXUE XUEBAO: ZHESHE BAN [JOURNAL OF SICHUAN UNIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE EDITION] No. 1, available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=4523.
67
Jiangsu Hebei deng sheng bufen qunzhong yueji xinfang shijian diaocha [An investigation
of skipping-level letters and visits by masses from Jiangsu, Hebei and other provinces],
LIAOWANG XINWEN ZHOUKAN [OUTLOOK WEEKLY], Oct. 30, 2004, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-10/30/content_2156474.htm;
Zhai Hao, Yu xinfang yu jiandu zhizhong [Put letters and visits under supervision], SHANGHAI
RENDA [SHANGHAI PEOPLE'S CONGRESS], Feb. 17, 2006,
http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/25015/4116961.html; Gaohao xinfang nuan minxin [Warm the
people’s hearts by resolving letters and visits well], YANGSHI GUOJI [CCTV INTERNATIONAL],
Nov. 20, 2005, http://www.cctv.com/program/fzbjb/20051216/101554.shtml.
68
Interviews.
69
“Jinhua Intermediate Court works hard on litigation-related letters and visits.” Courts have
also created “judicial relief” funds to assist poor litigants who are unable to enforce judgments
in their favor. Zuigao fayuan tan tuidong quanguo fanwei nei jianli zhixing jiuzhu jijin
[Supreme people’s court discusses promoting the establishment of an enforcement relief fund
nationwide], Jan. 21, 2007, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-01-26/114912148273.shtml.
70
Id. Likewise, some courts have issued instructions stating that all letters and visits must be
“resolved” by the judges handling the case – thus resulting in even greater pressure on judges.
Renmin Fayuan jiang tuixing faguan panhou dayi zhidu: chengban faguan dui dangshiren yiyi
jingxing jieshi shuoming [The courts will implement a system of judges answering questions
after decisions: judges who handle cases will be responsible for explaining their decisions to
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courts are being forced to change decisions to protect social stability and
that the letters and visits system is weakening judicial authority.71 Judges
comment that they sometimes alter decisions, pay parties from court
funds, or pressure losing parties to pay more money than ordered by the
court in order to assuage protestors.72
The ability of protests and petitions to influence court decisions is
a vicious circle. Judges know that the more they respond to protests, the
more they will encourage similar actions by others. As with media
influence, courts’ inability to resist popular pressure reflects concern with
social stability by Party-state officials. Fear that popular discontent may
result in unrest encourages officials to respond to such complaints.
China’s absence of democracy also plays a role: the lack of alternative
mechanisms for voicing public views encourages those with grievances to
resort to the letters and visits system and to the media. Given such
concerns, convincing protestors to terminate their protests becomes more
important than following legal and procedural standards.
Media coverage, protests, and petitions serve to highlight injustice
in the legal system, and in some cases result in decisions being changed
and aggrieved parties receiving redress. But the influence of both the
letters and visits system and the media sends a powerful message to
others with grievances that the courts are often not the ultimate arbiters of
legal disputes. In sensitive or controversial cases, Party leaders still hold
sway. Such influence also undermines courts’ claims to be authoritative
or to deserve public respect. Courts are confronting new sources of
pressure just as they are attempting to broaden their autonomy. Yet
increasing court authority and autonomy will require courts to develop the
ability to resist precisely these forms of pressure. Many in the courts are
aware of these trends, and acknowledge that courts must develop the
ability to resist popular pressure, but at present there are insufficient
incentives or opportunities for courts to do so.
C.

Controlled Transparency

Although courts have made significant rhetorical commitments to
openness, courts and the legal system continue to lack transparency.
parties to cases], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Nov. 3, 2005,
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=183759.
71
Woguo xinfang zhidu xianru sichong kunjing mianlin fazhi tiaozhan [Our nation’s letters
and visits system encounters four difficulties, faces challenges from rule of law], XINHUA
WANG [XINHUA NET], June 30, 2004, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-0630/12143565398.shtml.
72
Interviews.

26

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW

[21:1

Despite repeated statements that opinions will be publicly available, 73
including online, very few courts have actually made all or even sizeable
numbers of opinions available online.74 Most courts that do so select only
a small percentage of cases for publication. In general, decisions remain
difficult to obtain except through parties to cases, unless they have been
reported in the media.
Courts have also imposed new restrictions on the media’s ability
to report on cases. Although most cases are technically open to the public
and to the media, courts frequently restrict access in sensitive cases or
those that have attracted public attention. Journalists must obtain
permission from the court prior to covering a case – meaning that in
practice courts have discretion to deny entry. Journalists complain that it
remains difficult to obtain access to trials and decisions, in particular in
sensitive or high-profile disputes.
Rather than embracing transparency, or attempting to balance
positive and negative consequences of public scrutiny of the courts,
China’s courts are trying to control media coverage. Some advocates of
limited transparency appear to be concerned that too much openness
might further undermine confidence in the courts, because greater
transparency would also make clear the severity of problems in China’s
courts.75 Hence court officials have spoken of the need to increase their
openness at the same time that they have encouraged court propaganda
officials to work with the media to ensure positive coverage of the courts.
76
In Guangdong, for example, a notice from the Provincial High People’s
Court and Provincial Propaganda Department bans reporting on cases
prior to court decisions and prohibits the media from publishing views on
cases that differ from those of the courts, in effect barring criticism. 77
73
See, e.g., Wu Jing, Woguo sifa toumingdu chixu tigao [The continual increase in judicial
transparency in our nation], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Dec. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=188304.
74
He Weifang, Panjueshu shangwang nan zai hechu [What’s the difficulty in putting court
decisions online], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Dec. 15, 2005, available at http://lawthinker.com/show.asp?id=3025.
75
For criticism of such arguments, see id.; Jiang Ming’an, Panjueshu shangwang: yao jiji
tuijin erbushi huanxing [Putting decisions online: it should be pushed actively rather than
postponed], Apr. 11, 2006,
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/21601/21626/2006/4/zh286412202911460024004-0.htm.
76
In September 2006, for example, the SPC issued new rules restricting court officials’
contact with the media and giving courts the authority to ban media coverage of a range of
court cases. Vivian Wu, Press quiet on changes to reporting court cases, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 14, 2006.
77
Journalists who have violated the rules have been banned from reporting on courts in
Guangdong. Fayuan ‘fengsha’ liu jizhe, yinfa xinwen baodao yu sifa touming taolun [Six
journalists are ‘blocked’ by court, triggering discussion about judicial transparency],
JIANGNAN SHIBAO [JIANGNAN TIMES], Dec. 10, 2003, available at
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Such efforts are not unusual among Chinese Party-state institutions, but
they are in direct contrast to court claims to be embracing greater
openness.
Efforts by the courts to restrict media coverage highlight the fact
that courts are not passive in the face of external pressure. Courts have
also directly retaliated against the media through defamation litigation –
most often in cases brought by individual judges, but sometimes in cases
brought by courts themselves. Such actions show that courts may be
using their existing authority in new ways so as to resist external pressure.
D.

Court Inaction

Courts increasingly deal with difficult or sensitive cases by
inaction: cases are refused or left unresolved. In such cases courts
appear to hope either that some other state actor will resolve the case or
that the case will disappear. Courts have also formally closed their doors
to certain classes of disputes. Thus, for example, the Guangxi High
People’s Court issued a notice in 2004 listing thirteen categories of cases
that courts in Guangxi will not accept.78 These include real estate disputes
resulting from government decisions or institutional reforms, claims
brought by laid-off workers resulting from corporate restructuring, and
lawsuits resulting from a party’s failure to implement a government
decision regarding ownership or usage rights in property. Most of the
categories relate to government reforms of industry, agriculture, and land;
some, such as a ban on some classes of securities lawsuits, mirror
decisions by the Supreme People’s Court. In practice, courts have long
refused to accept certain categories of cases; the Guangxi decision is
unusual primarily because the court made the list of such cases public.
The decision drew criticism in China from scholars who argued that the
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2003-12/10/content_1223333.htm; He Weifang, Fayuan
ruhe duli yu meiti yingxiang [How will the court be independent from influence of the media],
ZHONGGUO FUNÜ BAO [CHINA WOMEN’S NEWS], Jan. 19, 2005, available at
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=27893; He Weifang,
Weishenme fayuan buke fengsha jizhe [Why courts may not block journalists], XINHUA WANG
[XINHUA NET], Dec. 10, 2003, http://www.legal-history.net/articleshow.asp?id=736; Zhou
Jialu, Chuanmei yu sifa guanxi de zhidu goujian [Establishing the relationship between the
media and the judiciary], XINWEN JIZHE [NEWS JOURNALIST],
http://xwjz.eastday.com/eastday/xwjz/node71701/node71703/userobject1ai1247619.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007).
78
Guangxi bu shouli 13 lei ruoshi qunti an, sheng gaoyuan cheng you guoqing jueding
[Guangxi refuses to accept 13 categories of cases relating to disadvantaged people, high court
asserts it is decided by the situation of the country], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH
DAILY], Aug. 24, 2004, available at http://news.qq.com/a/20040824/000070.htm.
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courts cannot refuse claims and cases that are permitted by law. The fact
that most of the categories of cases touch on areas of potential social
unrest is an echo of court concerns with popular pressure through protests
and the media: faced with such pressure, courts have apparently decided
that they may be better off not hearing such cases and leaving decisions to
other Party-state departments.
Courts’ decisions to leave contentious or sensitive issues for other
actors to resolve are understandable. Many disputes that courts refuse to
accept are cases that they in practice either could not resolve on their own
or are cases in which courts would not be able to implement any decisions
they did make. Courts would appear to gain little from hearing such cases
– even if technically such claims are allowed under existing laws.
Refusing to hear controversial claims also protects the courts from the
more extensive criticism or pressure they might receive if they ruled in
such cases. But doing so reinforces courts’ limited power to resolve
significant public grievances.
E.

Inequality and Shortages of Judges

Growing inequality within the courts threatens further to
undermine popular confidence in the courts. Widening inequality in
Chinese society is being reflected in the courts. Despite major efforts to
attract better qualified judges, many courts in China’s interior are finding
it difficult to attract qualified personnel and are losing existing judges to
higher paying jobs as lawyers, in particular in more developed areas.
Although the total number of judges remains large, more than
200,000,79 court officials have identified the loss of personnel in courts in
China’s less developed areas as a major problem. 80 In Guizhou, for
example, the President of the High People’s Court reported that more than
200 judges resigned between 2001 and 2005 while only eighty new
personnel passed the bar exam. The loss of personnel, combined with
large numbers of judges approaching retirement age, is making it
increasingly difficult to staff courts: the judge stated that many courts in

79

Estimates of the total number of judges vary, depending on precisely who is counted as a
judge. Nevertheless, most figures in recent years have appeared to be in the range of 200,000.
Some Chinese scholars have argued that China has far too many judges, noting that Chinese
judges on average handle vastly fewer cases per judge than do their Western counterparts –
although many Chinese judges are not involved in hearing cases. See, e.g., Zhang Wusheng,
Woguo faguan de chongzu yu fenliu yanjiu [Research into the reorganization and
repositioning of our nation’s judges], 2004 FALÜ KEXUE [LEGAL SCIENCE] No. 3.
80
2006 SPC WORK REPORT.
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Guizhou now find it difficult to form a three-judge panel to hear cases.81
Some commentators have argued that people without university degrees
should be permitted to take the bar exam in less developed areas in order
to ensure sufficient numbers of lawyers and judges .82
Some courts lack sufficient funds to pay new judges. In Hubei, for
example, local government budgets allocate only 200 yuan per month per
judge in salaries in some courts. 83 Even in Beijing, judges’ pay has
decreased in recent years as a result of reforms that eliminated bonus
payments to judges for handling specified numbers of cases. In the past
judges in Beijing were better paid than those working in other state
institutions, a reflection of courts’ ability to generate income from
charging filing and other fees to litigants.84 Such reforms are designed to
minimize incentives to courts to overcharge litigants and to equalize pay
among all civil servants. But they have also resulted in judges leaving to
pursue more lucrative careers.
Unequal development in and staffing of the courts risks further
weakening court attempts to increase their authority. Courts that lack
personnel complain of being overburdened by rising caseloads; some say

81
Zhang Linchun, Zhongxibu diqu sifa jigou rencai liushi wenti yanzhong [The serious
problem of personnel loss in judicial institutions in central and western regions], XINHUA
WANG [XINHUA NET], Mar. 13, 2006,
http://www.lianghui.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/2006lh/1151637.htm. The report stated that there
are only 900 judges in the 400 basic level courts in Guizhou province, meaning that on
average local courts have fewer than 2.5 judges. For a discussion of similar problems in
Sichuan province, see Daibiao tan falü rencai duiwu jianshe [Representatives discuss
construction of legal personnel system], TENGXUN WANG [TENCENT WEB], Mar. 10, 2006,
http://www.chinalawjob.com/service/hr/11_29_11_372.shtml. For a discussion of shortages
of judges in Hubei, see Faguan duanceng zhuangkuang lingren danyou: Yu Lü Zhongmei
daibiao duihua faguan duanceng weiji [The shortage of judges makes people concerned:
dialog with representative Lü Zhongmei on the crisis of the shortage of judges], FAZHI WANG
[LEGAL DAILY WEB], http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zt/2006-03/08/content_279135.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007).
82
Guojia tongyi sifa kaoshi bubi yikao ding qiankun [It’s not necessary for the national bar
exam to be finally decisive], XINJING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS], Dec. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.chineselawyer.com.cn/pages/2005-12-1/s32650.html.
83
Sifa gaige renzhong daoyuan fayuan jingfei “qianjing” jianming [Judicial reform shoulders
heavy responsibilities, the “future” of court funds becomes bright], DIYI CAIJING RIBAO [CHINA
BUSINESS NEWS], Nov. 14, 2005, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-1114/12258293328.shtml; Li Shourong, Guanyu nongcun jiceng fayuan jianshe de diaocha yu
sikao [Investigation and thoughts on the construction of countryside local courts], Changsha
Fayuan Wang [Changsha Court Web], Aug. 25, 2005,
http://cszy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=197.
84
Beijing gongwuyuan gongzi gaige,“feichai bumen” da shou yingxiang [Civil servants salary
reform in Beijing: “profitable departments” are impacted in a major way], LIAOWANG
DONGFANG ZHOUKAN [OUTLOOK ORIENTAL], Sept. 8, 2004, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-09/08/content_1956812.htm.
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they can barely manage to handle all of the cases before them.85 Many
courts appear unable to attract well-qualified personnel to serve as judges,
which in turn may harm courts’ ability to resist external pressure and to
increase public confidence. A brain drain in the judiciary risks furthering
popular beliefs that courts are not effective mechanisms for vindicating
individual rights or redressing grievances.
Courts should perhaps not bear too much of the blame for the
range of new problems that are undermining their authority. The
problems reflect the institutional framework in which courts operate.
These new problems have arisen as officials within the courts have called
for courts to play greater roles, but reflect the lack of support for broader
changes from leaders outside the courts.
IV.

DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION

Despite these problems, significant change is occurring in China’s
courts. But the most important recent developments in China’s courts are
coming from lower courts, rather than at the behest of the SPC. Three
trends are particularly noteworthy: increased horizontal interactions
among judges and the use of informal precedent; growing innovation by
judges; and the use of courts as fora for raising rights-based grievances.
First, lower courts are increasingly looking to other courts for
guidance when they encounter new or difficult legal questions.86 In the
past, courts generally had little option but to consult higher level courts.
In recent years, however, judges have increasingly looked horizontally, to
courts of equal rank outside their jurisdictions, for guidance. Judges from
a range of regions comment that they routinely consult the internet to
assist them when they encounter new questions, to learn how courts
elsewhere have handled similar issues. In particular, judges in less
developed areas note that they frequently look to online media reports,
case summaries, and in some cases decisions posted to court websites to
learn how other courts have handled cases. Judges encountering a novel
question likewise may telephone judges in other courts to discuss how
they have handled similar cases. Some judges say that they use email to
seek advice on pending cases from academics. Others, in particular those
in intellectual property tribunals, say that they use the internet to consult
materials about foreign law and to access foreign cases.
85

Liu Lan & Ying Qiming, Jiceng faguan xinli yali you duoda? [How serious is the mental
pressure facing local judges?], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS), Feb. 2, 2006,
available at http://oldfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=93729.
86
Benjamin L. Liebman & Timothy Wu, Chinese Network Justice, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 257
(2007).
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Such judicial networking, and the development of informal
patterns of precedent, may lead to more consistent application of the law.
The growth of the internet may also be facilitating the development of
professional identity among judges, who increasingly interact online, and
who appear ever more aware of the challenges similarly situated judges
face elsewhere in China.87 Greater professional identity among judges is
unlikely to alter how judges decide sensitive cases, but it may be assisting
judges as they seek to combat interference from higher-ups both within
and outside the courts. Increased professional identity may also result in
greater frustration among judges who face external interference.
The growth of horizontal interactions among judges is particularly
significant because it contrasts with top-down court reform. Top-down
reform has been largely technical, designed to improve the quality of
courts without altering institutional relationships with other state actors.
The growth of horizontal relationships suggests that courts may be able to
expand their own autonomy by looking to other courts for guidance rather
than to Party-state officials or court superiors.
Second, judicial networks may foster innovation. A small number
of local courts have engaged in significant legal innovation. Courts in
China have long engaged in experimentation. In recent years, however,
some courts have issued decisions that appear directly to challenge
existing legal norms or consciously to break new legal ground. Thus, for
example, local courts have experimented with creating a plea bargaining
system for criminal cases and with the creation of a system of local
precedent – despite the fact that neither is explicitly permitted under
existing law. In another example of innovation, a court in Henan ruled, in
what became known as the “Seed Case,” that a provincial pricing
regulation was “spontaneously invalid” because it conflicted with the
national Seed Law. The court thus challenged norms that dictate that
courts lack the power to invalidate laws or regulations. The case
generated a backlash from the provincial People’s Congress, which
sought to have the judges responsible for the case removed from office.
The judges initially lost their jobs, but regained their positions after the
national media reported on the case.88
87

Similar observations have been made regarding the growth of trans-national judicial
networks. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (Princeton University
Press 2004).
88
For a discussion of the case, see Zhao Lei, Li Huijuan: tiaozhan difang lifa [Li Huijuan:
challenging local legislation], July 25, 2004,
http://www.dffy.com/fayanguancha/fangyuan/200407/20040725162155.htm. Some scholars
in China have argued that the Seed Case should not be understood as novel or innovative,
because it is well-established that judges should not apply local or provincial regulations that
conflict with higher-level laws or regulations. But the Seed Case did appear innovative in
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Likewise, courts in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou have
innovated by finding for the media in defamation cases brought by
famous persons. The courts have directly or indirectly suggested that
famous persons should withstand a higher degree of scrutiny than
ordinary persons – despite the absence of any distinction between
ordinary and “public persons” in Chinese defamation law. 89 And in a
series of cases brought by university students, courts have held that
universities may be sued under China’s Administrative Litigation Law –
despite the widespread presumption that the law did not apply to
universities. 90 The cases have been interpreted as efforts by Chinese
courts to expand their jurisdiction in administrative litigation, a
noteworthy trend given that commentators have argued that courts have
been reluctant to undertake administrative cases given the often
influential positions of defendants in such cases.91
Some judicial innovation is the consequence of the wide
discretion Chinese judges have in resolving cases. Unclear legal
standards mean that courts frequently must fill gaps. Despite an
enormous volume of legislation over the past two decades, judges
continue to have extensive discretion in interpreting legal standards.
Increased use of this discretion may largely reflect practical necessity, not
increased court authority. Such discretion may also result in inconsistent
application of the law, a problem that has drawn attention, and significant
criticism, in recent years. Nevertheless, in some recent cases courts have
gone further than simply filling the gaps of unclear laws, directly
challenging norms, as in the Seed Case, or creating legal standards that
lack statutory support.
Court experimentation and innovation occurs in politically safe
cases, and outcomes are usually consistent with the interests of important
Party-state actors. Such decisions rarely challenge the authority of other
state actors. Indeed, it may be that innovation is only possible in cases in
which outcomes are consistent with powerful interests or there are no
strong adverse interests. Thus, for example, the first case to find a public
person standard resulted in a judgment in favour of a newspaper that was
a subsidiary of the official mouthpiece newspaper of the Shanghai
that the court chose to declare the local regulation invalid, rather than simply ignoring the
local regulation and applying the national law.
89
Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation: An Empirical Account of
Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT’L L. J. 33, 33-177 (2006).
90
For analysis of the cases, see Thomas F. Kellogg, “Courageous Explorers”?: Education
Litigation and Judicial Innovation in China, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141 (2007).
91
For an example of such arguments, see Li Fujin, Xingzheng shenpan de kunjing yu chulu
[The difficulties in and remedies for administrative adjudication], Sept. 19, 2003,
http://www.dffy.com/faxuejieti/xz/200311/20031119203349.htm.
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Municipal Communist Party Committee. Even in the Seed Case, where
the court directly challenged the authority of the Provincial People’s
Congress, the court found in favour of applying a national law.
The modest reach of judicial innovation in China highlights a key
element of court reform. With a very small number of exceptions, topdown reform has focussed on improving the efficiency and fairness of
courts as adjudicators of disputes, not on shifting the role or power of
courts within the system. The SPC does from time to time issue judicial
interpretations that appear to go well beyond the text of laws the National
People’s Congress has passed, but such interpretations rarely result in
direct challenges to the authority of other institutions. When courts do
appear to be seeking to expand their authority, including in defamation
litigation, the Seed Case, and some aspects of administrative litigation,
such steps have come from lower courts.92 Higher courts may directly or
indirectly support or acquiesce to such actions, and the SPC itself has
been responsible for a number of important reforms. 93 Nevertheless,
significant institutional change is not the direct result of top-down reform.
China’s courts have not begun to function as significant fora for
the adjudication of public rights. Indeed, the limited rise in caseloads and
the other modest steps toward reform suggest that China’s courts are still
some way from being effective adjudicators of private rights or even a
primary mechanism for resolving individual grievances. In many
respects, recent developments in China thus contrast with experiences in
many other countries, which have witnessed a “global expansion of
judicial power.” 94 This is not surprising; with limited exceptions, this
expansion of judicial power has largely occurred in democratic states in
which courts have the power of judicial review. 95 Moreover, Chinese
courts are still struggling to become significant fora for adjudicating and
enforcing private rights; doing so may be a predicate to serving a broader
role in adjudicating public rights. Recent developments in China’s courts
also appear to contrast with other countries in which significant
92

One exception to this pattern was the Qi Yuling case, in which the Supreme People’s Court
in 2001 seemed to suggest that a case could be brought directly under the PRC Constitution.
The decision was both opaque and controversial, and no subsequent cases have endorsed or
acknowledged the principle.
93
One recent example is the SPC’s decision to reform death penalty procedures and to hear all
final appeals itself. A consequence of the reform will be a major expansion of the size of the
SPC, with as many as 300 new judges being added to the court.
94
C. NEAL TATE & TORBJORN VALLINDER, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power: The
Judicialization of Politics, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 1-11 (New York
University Press 1995).
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2003).
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innovation or expansion of judicial power has often come from the top, in
particular from new or revamped constitutional courts. In China, the
most significant innovations appear to be coming from lower courts.
Reliance on local experimentation has been a characteristic of
China’s reform process more generally, and thus the courts are not unique
in relying on ground-up development. The nature of such reforms also
may reflect the fact that there is not a clear consensus on the role courts
should play in China; gradual and piecemeal reform may serve to delay
such questions. But recent trends also suggest that courts may come to
play broader roles and that such roles may be determined by lower courts
and litigants as well as by SPC edicts.
Third, although China’s courts are not fora for adjudicating public
rights, they have become fora for airing a range of grievances.96 Over the
past decade, litigants have brought a widening array of what might be
thought of as public grievances into the courts – including class actions,
public interest lawsuits on such issues as women’s and environmental
rights, and constitutional claims.97 Many such cases are being brought
with the assistance of lawyers who are explicitly seeking to use litigation
to bring social change. Courts have not always been receptive to such
claims; many such cases go unheard, unresolved, or, where decisions are
actually made, unenforced. The Party-state also appears increasingly
wary of such efforts, and has imposed new restrictions on lawyers and on
public interest litigation. 98 But the fact that these claims have been
permitted and at times even encouraged is particularly notable given
China’s political system: the combination of class actions, contingency
fees, administrative litigation, constitutional litigation, and cause
lawyering is not common in authoritarian systems (or in many systems of
any type outside the United States).
Such claims also highlight a characteristic of public litigation and
cause lawyering in China: when such claims succeed it is rarely because
of court decisions. The primary goal of many such lawsuits is to generate
96

Liebman, Innovation through Intimidation. For example, the total number of labour cases
heard by the courts more than doubled between 2000 and 2004, increasing from 76,378 to 164,
994. LAW Y.B. CHINA 2001-2005.
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Benjamin L. Liebman, Note, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523
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public, and in particular media, attention sufficient to compel official
action. When change does result, it is more often from the intervention of
Party-state officials than from a court opinion. Litigants may hope for a
binding court decision, but using the courts as a forum for generating
public pressure is often equally, if not more, important in cases in which
claims succeed. The use of litigation to create public pressure and to
compel extra-judicial action is not unique to China, but China may be
distinct in its extreme reliance on extra-judicial responses to major public
disputes in the courts.
Recent steps by China’s courts to hear a broader range of
grievances are largely reactive: the use of courts to pursue public
grievances reflects rising expectations among ordinary people toward the
courts. These expectations and efforts are at least partially a consequence
of attention to the law and the legal system in the Chinese media. Such
trends also reflect the development of the Chinese legal profession. The
fact that China now has more than 150,000 lawyers 99 is resulting in
greater incentives to lawyers to bring a wider range of cases.
Measuring popular confidence, or disillusionment, in the courts is
difficult. Courts have been subject to widespread criticism in the media,
for reasons ranging from corruption and biased decisions to inconsistent
application of legal standards. 100 Greater use of the courts may suggest
greater confidence in the courts among ordinary people, but it may also
reflect the rising volume of grievances and the lack of alternative
mechanisms for resolving complaints. Thus individuals may resort to the
courts not because they believe the courts will be more effective than
administrative actors but rather because they believe that they lack the
ability to obtain redress through administrative means. Regardless of
why individuals turn to the courts, growing media coverage and greater
use of the courts risk increased disillusionment, and thus decreased
reliance on the courts, if such expectations are not met.
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LAW Y.B. CHINA 2006, at 1001.
Liebman, Innovation through Intimidation. For example, Teng Biao advocates media
oversight of the courts on the grounds that the judiciary is not independent, fair, or efficient,
and that the courts are widely distrusted. Teng Biao, Sifa de gui sifa, yulun de gui yulun? cong Zhang Jinzhu an dao Huang Jing an [Give the judiciary what belongs to the judiciary,
give public opinion what belongs to public opinion? - From the Zhang Jinzhu case to the
Huang Jing case], http://www.boxun.com/hero/tengb/20_1.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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The developments discussed here do not reflect the full reach of
court reform in China. Important reforms have also been undertaken in
developing rules of evidence, in clarifying oversight systems within
courts, and in providing judges with better access to legal information. In
addition, recently announced reforms to procedures in capital cases may
have a significant effect on the criminal process. But few, if any, such
changes touch on the courts’ power relative to other state actors.
Nevertheless, the diverging expectations toward courts among senior
officials, local judges, and ordinary litigants also reflect a system in
which the proper and potential roles of the courts are increasingly
contested and in which courts are increasingly coming into conflict with
other state actors.
V.

IMPLICATIONS: RESTRICTED REFORM?

The fact that much of the important change is coming from the
bottom shows that assessing reform in China’s courts may be difficult. It
also reflects the need to distinguish between changes in courts’ roles and
steps that make the courts more efficient and fair in their existing roles.
This section first examines in more detail whether recent developments
suggest changes in court’s formal authority, and then returns to the two
questions posed at the start of this essay.
A.

Reformed Authority?

Recent developments do not suggest fundamental changes in
courts’ power relative to other state actors. This is not surprising: most
court reform has come from the courts themselves, but strengthening
court power is not something that the courts can do on their own. As Part
I argues, courts have engaged in significant reforms in recent years and
are better positioned than in the past to resist some forms of external
pressure. But reforms have largely addressed technical or administrative
problems: improving education and training of judges, raising
qualifications of new judges, fighting corruption, and taking modest steps
to reduce the political emphasis in court work. Central Party leaders have
not emphasized reform or strengthening of the courts; indeed courts
received only modest attention in the reports of the 15th and 16th
Congresses of the Communist Party, in 1997 and 2002.
Nevertheless, significant change is coming from the courts.
Courts have taken steps to increase their own autonomy and authority, by
raising education standards and by increasingly using legal arguments to
resist external pressure. A small number of lower courts have begun to
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engage in significant innovation. Such developments suggest that,
despite the formal limitations on court authority, the future role of courts
may be significantly influenced by how courts define their own roles and
by how litigants use the courts. There is significant room for ground-up
evolution.
Such evolution reflects necessity: courts are confronting a
widening range of cases and cases of increased complexity. Courts are
under pressure to resolve disputes that come before them in ways that
prevent claims from escalating but often lack clear legal guidance as to
how to do so. They thus have both the incentive and the space to engage
in innovation and experimentation. As Part III explains, most such cases
result in outcomes that are consistent with powerful interests; there are
few signs of courts doing so in ways that diverge from the interests of
powerful parties.
Ground-up developments in the courts may, however, also be
resulting in courts that are increasingly in conflict with other Party-state
and official institutions. This is particularly apparent in court interactions
with the media, where courts have responded to media oversight by
imposing limits on reporting and filing defamation lawsuits. But courts
also appear to be increasingly in conflict with people’s congresses and
procuratorates, both of which have attempted to strengthen their
supervision of the courts, and also with administrative departments. Thus
although courts have not expanded their authority over other state actors,
it does appear that court decisions are likely to result in greater friction
with such actors.
B.

Explaining New Roles

Recognizing the limitations of court reform in China is not meant
to trivialize the changes thus far. Given that there was virtually no
functional legal system when legal reforms commenced in 1978, and the
political context in which China’s courts operate, it would have been
unrealistic to expect a faster rate of change. Indeed, asking why China’s
courts are not more independent or more powerful may be less important
than understanding why courts have been permitted to develop as they
have. Why have courts been permitted to hear a wider range of
grievances and to take even modest steps in the direction of increased
authority and autonomy? Put differently, why has China’s leadership
tolerated developments such as administrative litigation, class actions,
contingency fees, and a widening sphere of public interest litigation?
Courts have been permitted to innovate, in some cases by directly looking
to Western precedent. The state itself has devoted significant resources to
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developing a legal aid system and to legal education, encouraging not
only greater awareness of law but also more frequent use of law to
challenge official actors.
Western writings on the roles of courts have largely focused on
the question of why a democratic regime would create independent
courts. 101
Theories include the desire to make political bargains
102
credible, the usefulness of courts to politicians who wish to shift blame
from unpopular government policies, 103 and courts’ roles in keeping
administrative bureaucracies in line with government policy.104 Others
have argued that independent courts are a product of political competition
and are attractive to political parties that may one day find themselves out
of power, 105 or that judicial review is attractive to new democracies
because it serves as “insurance to potential electoral losers.” 106 Such
theories have limited applicability in China, where a non-democratic
regime has encouraged development of the courts, and where courts have
limited powers over other administrative actors.
Another common explanation for the creation of a functional legal
system is that such institutions are necessary for economic development.
An interest in economic development has certainly played a role in
China’s legal reforms, and reforming legal institutions may be a more
important justification for court reform going forward. But this
explanation appears unsatisfactory in China, where economic
development has progressed despite the absence of a legal system that
provides effective guarantees of property rights. A desire to conform to
international norms may play some role – but also seems a weak
explanation for China’s recent experiences, in particular the
encouragement of class actions and cause lawyering. Three alternative
theories are more plausible.
First, courts are one of a number of Party-state institutions serving
as a safety valve for a widening range of popular complaints. Permitting
grievances to be raised through class actions, administrative litigation, or
101
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102
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even (in a small number of cases) constitutional litigation may be
preferable to such complaints not being heard at all – or being raised on
the streets. The safety valve function of courts also explains why courts
may accept but then not decide some difficult cases: the hope may be that
once cases are filed, grievances will dissipate over time. The courts are
not unique, or even particularly prominent, in this role. The letters and
visits system plays a broader, and arguably more significant, function as a
safety valve. Courts are thus one of a number of fora for raising
grievances and courts that permit such grievances to be raised act in the
interests of social stability.
Concern with social stability also helps explain inconsistent trends
in court reform. The Party-state has emphasized the role of the courts and
has given tremendous attention to courts and law in the media. At the
same time, Party-state leaders continue to tolerate, and even encourage, a
range of official and quasi-official actors to intervene in court decisionmaking. Concerns with social stability force Party-state officials to strive
to be even more responsive to public views than might be the case in a
democratic system. The fact that all actors in the system know that Partyofficials have the power to intervene and are evaluated in significant part
based on whether or not they maintain stability in their regions makes it
difficult for officials to ignore protests on the grounds that the authority of
the courts must be respected.
Authoritarian regimes may have a greater stake in being
responsive to public demands regarding the courts than democratic states,
where the political process provides a mechanism for public grievances to
be aired and resolved. The legitimacy of China’s leadership depends on
its ability to both channel and contain populism; concerns that popular
expressions of outrage may spin out of control encourage rapid
intervention in the legal system. The counter-majoritarian function of
courts thus may be harder to accept in a non-democratic society, where
courts lack authority and public confidence, than in a democracy. This is
particularly the case in China, where the rise of social unrest makes
officials particularly sensitive to public opinion and where the courts lack
a history of being viewed as either authoritative or neutral.
Such developments pose risks to the courts. The courts and the
Party-state are fostering increased expectations that the courts can and
should be used as a vehicle for protecting legal rights. The risk is that,
absent greater change in and to the courts, such expectations will not be
met and trust and confidence in the courts will be further eroded –
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sending those with grievances to other institutions in even greater
numbers.107
Second, the evolving roles of courts, including increasing
conflicts with other Party-state institutions, reflect the development of
institutional competition in the Chinese political system. The central
Party-state has encouraged a range of official actors – including courts,
the media, letters and visits bureaux, the procuratorates, Party discipline
authorities, and peoples’ congresses – to play oversight roles, often over
each other. Attempts by the courts to expand their autonomy and
authority are consistent with similar steps being taken by other actors.
This reflects an emerging characteristic of institutional relationships in
China, one that appears to be a crucial part of the institutionalization of
the Party-state that has helped to explain its resilience. 108 The aim
appears to be to encourage a range of official actors to expand their roles
in resolving grievances and fighting abuses, and to serve as checks on
each other. Some greater transparency is encouraged, but within the
limits of Party oversight and primarily by Party-state actors. Courts are
one of many institutions playing such complimentary roles. Others
include procuratorates, the media, people’s congresses, and Party
discipline commissions. Thus any expansion in court roles or authority
may reflect the increased attention to resolving grievances and expanding
oversight in the Chinese system, not greater authority of the courts.
Wrongdoing is addressed, and Party-state legitimacy is maintained,
without fostering the development of non-state checks on official action.
Chinese courts thus serve not as an arbiter among different interests in the
political system, but rather as one of many institutions playing parallel
roles. China’s leadership is sensitive to the possibility that allowing more
prominent roles to non-state actors may undermine central authority. In
the legal system, however, allowing a widening range of grievances to be
brought by individuals and organizations may also be an effective tool for
asserting state control.
Similarly, the permissive attitude toward some developments in
the courts reflects the fact that courts are not viewed as rival sources of
power. Party officials are not worried that courts may become significant
checks on official action. Instead, development of the courts serves state
107
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interests in curbing abuses, maintaining control, and using the
development of the legal system to reinforce state legitimacy.
Third, ground-up development of the courts may be a source of
judicial power. The ability of judges to network horizontally may lead to
greater authority and autonomy of the courts. The trajectory of court
development may not be entirely determined by top down edicts, or
constitutional structure. Chinese judges themselves are increasingly
looking to the roles judges play in other countries as they seek to define
their own positions. Likewise, litigants’ aspirations for the legal system
appear to derive from both rising attention to the role of law and courts
and from international norms. This explanation for recent developments
in China’s courts is one perhaps not fully explored in recent writings
about judicial power.
Many countries have experienced an expansion of judicial power
in recent decades, often from constitutional courts, from the top-down. It
remains too soon to speak of fundamental changes to the power of
China’s courts. But China may be unusual in the importance of groundup developments.
C.

Future Roles: Fairness without Independence?

Understanding why the Chinese Party-state has permitted even
the level of court reform experienced thus far yields insight into a central
question facing China’s courts: what are the possible limits of court
development in a non-democratic society? Many in the West and in
China have looked to China’s courts in the hope that they may play a
transformative role in the Chinese political system. But the more
pertinent question, at least at present, may be what role courts can play
within the current system.
Can courts play a significant nontransformative role – can they serve as fair and efficient adjudicators of
private disputes, and perhaps as checks on some forms of official action,
without political change? And, if they do so, will they legitimize Party
rule, or will the development of a more professionalized judiciary
inevitably lead to courts that challenge Party authority?
Recent developments and debates in China have largely avoided
this question.109 Many in China seeking greater authority for the courts
have been heavily influenced by Western, and in particular American,
writings on courts. Some of the discussion in China echoes debates
109
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concerning the role of the judiciary in democracies: what is the
relationship between courts and legislatures, do courts have too much
discretion to interpret vague laws, are courts subject to excessive popular,
and in particular media, pressure? But the questions facing China’s
courts and judges may also be very different from those faced by their
counterparts in the West. Can judges develop the capacity to resolve nonsensitive cases fairly? Can the range of cases subject to external
intervention be reduced? Can courts be encouraged to do so without at
the same time prompting courts to play broader roles? Does the fact that
the Chinese courts operate in a non-democratic context suggest that they
should have a greater, or lesser, role in resolving important questions
facing Chinese society?
China’s effort to create courts that act fairly without challenging
single-Party rule is not unprecedented. Other single-party states –
including Spain under Franco, and modern Singapore – have had courts
that commentators have viewed as largely fair and independent in their
handling of non-sensitive or non-political cases.110 Parallels may also be
drawn to Japanese courts, which were largely independent both in the late
imperial period and also, after democratization, during the long period of
Liberal Democratic Party rule.111 Similarly, recent writing on Egypt has
explored why that authoritarian regime has created an independent
constitutional court.112
Recent Chinese experience does not fit squarely into any of these
models. In contrast to Singapore and Japan, for example, the range of
cases deemed to be sensitive in China is extraordinarily wide – and
includes not only direct challenges to Party authority or major criminal
cases, but also a wide range of cases attracting public attention, as well as
cases involving litigants with ties to Party-state officials. In contrast to
Franco’s Spain, where a degree of independence was possible because
courts’ powers were extremely limited and courts played little role in
110
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creating legal values, China’s courts have become significant fora for the
airing of rights-based grievances. And in contrast to Egypt, where the
constitutional court was established and developed in significant part due
to its role in furthering economic development, courts in China have
developed into significant fora for the airing of rights-based claims even
absent their serving as effective guarantors of property rights. 113
Moreover, the most significant changes in Chinese courts’ roles appear to
be coming from lower courts, not the Supreme People’s Court.
Those looking for China’s courts to be agents of change are likely
to be disappointed. The fact that a widening range of cases – including
labour rights, constitutional claims, and environmental disputes – is
finding its way into court does not necessarily mean that courts are
playing a greater role in enforcing rights protections. Courts’ roles
remain largely reactive, and their reactive capacities remain weak. Courts
are still struggling to develop the functional ability to resolve individual
cases. In the short term, the crucial question for the courts is whether
they can further develop the capacity to serve as neutral and efficient
decision-makers in routine, private cases.
Developing the capacity of China’s courts to handle routine cases
fairly would be a significant accomplishment. Doing so would also be
consistent with two of the three explanations offered above for the
development of the courts to date: serving as a safety-valve for
discontent and grievances, and institutionalizing the operation of the
Party-state. But the third explanation for court development, that
horizontal and ground-up development of the courts may lead to greater
court autonomy, suggests that further development of the courts may also
give rise to increased tensions with other Party-state actors. As courts
continue to develop horizontally, and as judges develop professional
identities, it may become increasingly difficult to constrain court
development. By encouraging the development of more professional
judges, the Party-state may also be fostering greater challenges.
Debate over the proper role of courts is a characteristic of most
societies, and in particular of democratic societies. What is particularly
noteworthy about recent developments in China is that such debates have
become open, with scholars, judges, and other commentators arguing for
expanded judicial power, for fundamental changes to the structure of
courts, and even for court oversight of the Communist Party. Debates in
China about the role of courts thus resonate with debates in the West –
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In Egypt, as Moustafa describes, the Constitutional Court has developed into a forum for
challenging the regime. In China, in contrast, courts have neither challenged single-Party rule
nor served as fora for those seeking to do so.
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where there is of course also significant ambiguity and controversy about
the proper roles of courts acting in counter-majoritarian fashion in
democratic societies. China’s courts continue to face many problems that
have undermined their effectiveness for decades; but they also appear
increasingly to be confronting the types of questions and challenges that
are faced by courts in other societies, albeit in a very different political
context.
Recent developments suggest that courts’ ability to serve broader
aims may depend on their developing greater authority, either on their
own or at the behest of the Party-state. Courts’ ability to do so will be
shaped by Party-state policy, but will also reflect the continued ground-up
development of the courts. The roles of courts and judges are no longer
solely defined by top-down pronouncements; courts, judges, litigants, and
the media are all shaping expectations about the roles that the legal
system can and should play. Judges appear to be looking to the roles
judges play in other countries as they seek to define their own positions;
litigants’ aspirations likewise appear to derive both from rising attention
to the role of judges and from international norms. Recent attempts to
steer judges away from “Western rule of law theories” are a tacit
acknowledgment of such trends. Continued ground-up development of
the courts may be crucial to courts’ serving the Party’s interests – but may
also promote new challenges. The central question remains whether
courts can become fair arbiters of individual disputes without inevitably
questioning and challenging the political power of the state. The most
significant development regarding China’s courts is that their role is
increasingly contested.

